Book Review: An Unhurried View of Copyright by Brown, Ralph S., Jr.
of thinking that the system is permanent or the trends irreversible. It
is a measure of the extent to which Professor Dahl has succeeded in
avoiding being bemused by the precision of his own researches that he
himself concludes this book by warning us of just this intellectual
fallacy.
LEON BRITTAN *
AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT. By Benjamin Kaplan.' New
York: Columbia University Press. 1967. Pp. ix, 142. $5.oo.
This book is based upon the graceful and vigorous Carpentier Lec-
tures given by Professor Kaplan at The Columbia Law School in x966.
The lectures were delivered during the accelerating momentum of the
general copyright law revision, the chief subject of the third lecture.
Late in 1966, after extended hearings, a final draft had been reported
out of a House subcommittee. What is said to be a "substantially
identical" 2 bill was promptly introduced in the new Congress, favorably
reported, and sent on to Senate hearings that commenced in March,
1967. To the extent that this review comments on Professor Kaplan's
analysis of the revision effort, it may be overtaken by events. Never
mind; when the apocalyptic vision of a total computerized communi-
cations network is realized perhaps the dead time between com-
position and dissemination will be reduced to microseconds. Meanwhile,
one accepts a certain stately pace for academic publications, perhaps
unchanged since "Caxton founded his press in Westminster in 1476"
(p. 2).
That is the author's starting point, for it is only with the spread of
printing that copyright begins to be of interest, or even to exist as a
legal notion. In a sparkling review of the history, which includes some
new information and interpretations, along with the major events, the
first lecture brings us quickly to i909, the date of the last effective
overhaul of the American statute.
Along the way in Kaplan's time machine, our guide shows us
copyright "being gradually secreted in the interstices of the censor-
ship" (p. 4). Censorship and guild control of the booksellers dwindle
away at the end of the 17 th century. We pause before the first copy-
right statute anywhere, that of 1710. We tour the echoing i8th-century
corridors where lie entombed the notion that a perpetual copyright
existed at common law, of such force that it could survive the limited
term provided by the statute. We cross to the United States, observe
a similar statute of 179o, and inspect the weighty mass of Wheaton
v. Peters,3 which enthroned the primacy of the statute.
What the author gives us is much more than a sightseeing tour. He
is concerned to demonstrate that the early cases dealt with exact
* Barrister at Law, Inner Temple; Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for
North Kensington at the 1966 General Election.
1 Royall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2 H.R. REP. No. 83, 9oth Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967). The bill, H.R. 2512, goth
Cong., ist Sess. (x967), passed the House, as amended, Apr. 11, 1967.
3 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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copies, that they were still a contest of publisher against publisher,
not of author against plagiarizing author. Well into the I9 th century,
abridgments and translations were free of control by the owner of the
original work; they were thought to have a value of their own. But
during the same era when Mr. Justice Story was fashioning the adaptable
concept of fair use of copyrighted materials, the scope of protection
began to expand, inflating the claims of authors to exclusive possession
(one landmark case, Daly v. Palmer,4 created property in the dramatic
situation of the heroine tied to a railroad track), and enlarging the
kinds of work entitled to protection (in another landmark, Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,5 Holmes proclaimed the artistic
integrity of circus posters).
All this serves as a prelude to the main theme of the second lecture.
Here the fortunes of the statute of 19o9 and the penetrating influence
of Judge Learned Hand, who went on the bench in that same year,
are entwined. The author's thesis, baldly put, is that too much material
came to be protected, while too little scope was left for borrowing and
imitation. After some aberrant gestures toward the standard of inven-
tion in patents, the courts settled down in easy acceptance of a very
modest definition of originality as the only requirement for copyright.
They required only that the work, in a literal sense, originate with
the claimant. This was logically consistent with the position that
plagiarism consisted only of copying- another departure from the
right of a patentee, who can exclude everyone from his invention, even
the independent discoverer close on his heels. Learned Hand's striking
illustration of the first proposition can be extended to the second as
well: "[I] f by some magic a man who had never known it were to
compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,'
and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though
they might of course copy Keats's." 6 By the same token, if Keats had
a copyright, Hand's secluded odist would not be an infringer, since he
did not copy.
This position, "modest in its pretension to monopoly" (p. 44),
would be tolerable, Professor Kaplan maintains, if it had remained
modest in its application. But the courts have been willing to find
infringement in works that were far removed from literal copying, or
that took only fragments, and those not conspicuously novel, from
the plaintiff's work. Professor Kaplan, who is not overawed even by
Olympian Zeus, hammers home his thesis with respectful criticism
of three of Learned Hand's most magisterial and influential opinions.7
While he is understanding of the animus which turns judges against
defendants who skate too close to the line (as in the recent Ethan
'6 Fed. Cas. 1132 (No. 3552) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868).
5 i88 U.S. 239 (1903).
6 Sheldon v. Metro-GoIdwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
' Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 669 (1936); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d i19 (2d Cir.
193o), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298
F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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Frome case 8) the author asserts his own willingness and preference
to let those using copyrighted material take even protected details
of "expression," if "they are 'improved' by changes in which the user
himself displays substantial authorship" (pp. 49-50).
From his analysis of the prototypical case of the literary work-
the book - the author moves on to a consideration of current standards
with respect to music, designs, and "fact work" (maps, reference
works, and the like). This is one stretch where the variety of problems
makes the view not entirely unhurried. We catch little more than a
glimpse of several features of the passing landscape. These quick
exposures may be confusing to the uninitiated. But they do bring out
a main point that the author wants to make. It is wrong and mis-
leading, he contends, to think of copyright protection as all of a piece.
Different media have different needs. A plastic Santa Claus figure is
not the same thing as a Rembrandt etching.
There is very little here that I can find to take issue with, either in
the author's reading of history, or in his appraisal of the state of the
art. It does seem to me a little brutal to characterize attempts to
frame an industrial design protection statute as a "curious form of
supererogative folly" (p. 56). Such a statute could at least get the
whole subject out of copyright, where it does not belong. I also have
to register disagreement with the opinion that the decision 9 forbidding
Jack Benny to parody "Gaslight" by simply hamming the exact
dialogue is "wrong -and possibly unconstitutional" (p. 69). But then
the Supreme Court was evenly divided, so Professor Kaplan has as
many unidentified Justices on his side as I have on mine. The difference
is that, on my reading of the facts, my Justices are right. The Mad
Magazine case,10 involving disrespectful words for old songs, is correct,
and easily distinguishable. Alfred E. Neuman wrote some new words.
Since these differences are so trifling, it is doubtless time, and past
time, for the reviewer to disclose - indeed, to declare - that his basic
outlook is the same as the author's." That is, I agree that copyright
should give "necessary support and encouragement to the creation
and dissemination of fresh signals or messages to stir human intelligence
and sensibilities" (p. 74). But to give more than is necessary may
misallocate resources, and, of much greater importance, hamper the
process of continual imitation and accretion by which we learn and,
we like to think, add to the store of knowledge. There are very few
spontaneously inventive people. Even fewer are gloriously and effec-
tively inventive. The rhetoric about authors and their natural rights
invokes Shakespeare and Milton. The reality is likely to deal with
comic books or soap dishes. For that matter, if there had been a well
'Davis v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 24o F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
' Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9 th Cir. x956), affd by an equally
divided court, without opinion, sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (x958).
1 Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964).
11 Cf. B. KAPLAN & R. BRowN, CASES ON COPYRIGHrT, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
AND OTHER TOpIcS .... (1960).
HeinOnline -- 80 Harv. L. Rev.  1623 1966-1967
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
developed copyright system in his day, we all know that Shakespeare
would have been in deep trouble.
Our trouble is not that the system is fundamentally wrong but that
we may have become over-refined in our search for guilty resemblances.
We really do not know just what it takes to evoke the optimum output
of words and music. This is something that should be capable of
economic analysis. So far as I know, no such analysis has been carried
through. 'Two young lawyer-economists were working on this, but
by a tragic and staggering coincidence, both of them died. 12 Even if
we had a good theoretical model, it would be hard to apply it to
particular cases, as we see from Professor Baxter's admirable recent
economic analysis of the patent monopoly.13
We are therefore obliged to make what we can of things as they are.
If one has an antiprotectionist bias one is entitled, indeed obliged, to
look skeptically at every proposed extension of protection. Should
song writers get more from recording companies? Well, are they under-
paid? That is, are enough people staying in the business to produce
the quantity and variety of songs that society somehow desires? And
so on, through scores of industries and markets for the products of
brain and hand.
These considerations bring us to the economics, law, and politics of
statutory revision, to which most of the third lecture is devoted - with
politics taken to mean the clash of interest groups before the Congress.
The new bill has been in gestation for a decade. It is a thoroughly
professional piece of work, reflecting great credit on the Copyright
Office draftsmen. It is not a simple statute; but the issues involved
are not simple either; they are intricate and delicate. It lights up
many dark corners of the 19o9 Act with the help, for example, of a
new first section with thirty-two paragraphs of definitions. 14 It deals
sensibly with the formalities of notice and registration, easing the
harsh forfeitures for technical defects, against which even judges had
begun to rebel. It flattens the great divide between unpublished and
published works, bulldozing into the federal system all works "fixed
in any tangible medium of expression." 15 This ends (almost) the
anomaly created by the proposition that performance is not publication,
which made it possible for music and drama to be performed (and
broadcast) forever without having to come within the limited duration
of statutory copyright.
The trouble with'the new bill, as Professor Kaplan points out, is
that its thrust is generally toward a greater scope of protection.'0 The
"Hurt & Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 Am. EcoN.
Rxv. (No. 2, i965 Papers and Proceedings) 42r (i966), was a provocative begin-
ning. See, for a full consideration of a field adjoining copyright, W. BAumO, &
W. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTs-THE EcoNoinc DnLxA (i966). F. MAcHLUP,
TE PRODUCTION AND DIsTBuTmON or KNOWLEDGE IN TnE UNITED STATES (1962)
provides a comprehensive framework for analysis.
"3 Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE LJ. 267 (1966).
'4 H.R. 2512, goth Cong., Ist Sess. § io (1967).
'
51Id. § 102.
"eSee H.R. REP. No. 83, goth Cong., ist Sess. 3 (1967): "Despite the com-
plexity and particularization of some of its provisions, -however, the basic aim
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most visible evidence of this is the extension of duration of copyright,
from the present scheme of 28 years plus a second 28-year term if the
person entitled wants to claim it, to a term measured by the life of
the author plus 50 years, or, for a "corporate" author, a term of 75
years. How long a copyright should last is one of those questions that
is hard to answer objectively, even with the assistance of refined
analysis (which, as I have already remarked, we do not have). I have
yet to hear a self-sustaining argument for the 5o-year period after
the life of the author, beyond the fact that it is found in many other
countries. Conformity on our part is doubtless an aid to international
harmonization, in itself a good and indeed necessary thing in an age
of global communication. But, whatever the merits, a longer term
obviously gives something to everybody on the producing side of the
communications and entertainment industries, and may have eased the
occasional concessions that were elsewhere exacted from one group or
another.
The organized interests that make their views emphatically and
untiringly known do not represent sharp conflicts between producers
and users of copyrightable material. We are hearing from industries
in which the firms are often quite conglomerate in structure. In
copyright, they are now producers, now users. Thus, motion pictures
are an important protected industry, as well as being enormous con-
sumers of copyrighted stories and music. The broadcasters are even
more prodigious consumers, and, in one guise or another, are producers
of programs for which they want protection. It is consequently possible
to perceive in the bill, without any sinister implications whatever, an
elaborate sequence of tradeoffs. For example, the i9o9 Act has a
royalty ceiling of two cents a song for compulsory licenses of recording
rights. It has survived since 19o9, "to the consternation of economists,"
as Professor Kaplan remarks (p. loS). The song writers propose to
do away with the compulsory license. The recording industry resists,
successfully. As haggling continues about an increase in the royalty
ceiling, the recording industry should not be unmindful that the bill
creates a new right, protecting sound recordings (performances, apart
from the compositions performed) against "piracy" by exact copying.
So, all along the way, the trend is to tighten old exemptions, to
create new ones sparingly, to create some new rights, and to define old
ones expansively.
Only late in the contest did a new force, of predominantly users'
interests, appear on the field. This was the "Ad Hoc Committee on
Copyright Law Revision," loosely organized under the aegis of the
National Education Association. Its chief impetus came from those
who saw in the new bill a mortal threat to the new ease of access to
classroom material made possible by the photocopying explosion. The
Ad Hoc Committee, taking under its wing the educational broadcasters
who also thought they were being short-changed, sounded strident
alarms that photocopying would become as illicit as counterfeiting
of the bill is very simple: to insure that authors receive the encouragement they
need to create and the remuneration they fairly deserve for their creations."
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(no more true under the new law than the present one). Even if the
interests for which the Ad Hoc Committee spoke did not establish an
educational exemption, they won some concessions, notably in the
form of a new statutory definition of "fair use," a definition given
generous scope by interpretations in the report of the House Com-
mittee.
A more diffuse user interest -perhaps inadequately represented
because of its diffusion - is concerned with the fantastic potential of
information storage and retrieval through computers. The draft bill,
even while the draftsmen were admitting that the question was a close
one, appeared to make the ingestion of copyrighted material by a
computer an infringement. Absent an exemption, there would be little
question that a computer printout of a protected work would infringe.
But it is highly questionable whether input alone should be controllable.
The issue goes far beyond conceptualization - whether the work has
been "copied" or "fixed" inside the computer. This is another instance
where Professor Kaplan, while warning against the premature solution
of the revision draft, emphasizes that we ought to "proceed not by
deduction from a monistic premise but upon a series of judgments
about ends served and disserved by particular measures" (p. 124).
Once rights or exemptions are riveted into a statute, vested interests
rapidly encyst them; their removal requires painful surgery. The
seemingly casual jukebox exemption of i9o9 is the classic example.
Media of greater social significance are today in such a state of flux
that it seems quite undesirable to attempt a statutory resolution that
may not be alterable for a generation or two. It is hard to guess which
may turn out worse, the offhand disposition of computer problems, or
the elaborate compromise that has been proposed with respect to CATV.
• These and other uncertainties lead Professor Kaplan "with regret
and some misgiving" (p. iii) to propose the creation of a regulatory
commission. One shares his sentiments. For middle-aged New Dealers,
a proposal for an administrative commission to deal with a set of
problems beyond the detailed grasp of the legislature conveys a sense
of d$j2 vu. For other reasons, including the predictable opposition of
everyone who is getting something out of the new bill, such a proposal
is not now ripe for detailed examination. But the conditions that elicit
it will not disappear. It is altogether certain that, in whatever form
the bill passes, it will contain clumsy compromises, and failures of
prevision. It ought to be put under intense scrutiny, say for five years,
and then formally reviewed. The congressional committees and their
staffs are not going to provide such scrutiny; they must turn to other
pressing matters. The Copyright Office has considerable capabilities,
and also deficiencies, for this task. Once its leadership has recovered
from the revision effort, it will be plunged into administration of the
new provisions.
A modest suggestion is that there should be created, either as part
of the statute or by separate joint resolution, a Copyright Review
Council.17 Its mission should be simply to study the operation of the
"
7 The nomenclature and the proposal are in part suggested by a recommen-
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statute. It should have substantial public representation, both from
government and from the public at large. Since the Copyright Office
is a part of the Library of Congress, the whole operation can dwell on
Capitol Hill, not at the executive end of Pennsylvania Avenue.
There are so many segments of public policy, and so much speciali-
zation built up around them, that it is hard to enlist sustained attention
on behalf of the general public interest in any one. The chief criticism
I would direct against my review proposal is that it might be taken
over by interested parties even sooner than a regulatory commission
might be. Still, the activities that are touched by copyright are, I think,
of growing interest, as our leisure-directed society consumes ever
increasing amounts of culture and entertainment.
Professor Kaplan aimed to "introduce the intelligent general lawyer
to the law and mystique of copyright" (p. i). As an academic quasi-
specialist I cannot tell whether he has hit his target. The manner is
delightful -who would expect that a work on copyright could make
one reader laugh? But Professor Kaplan is not a simple man when it
comes to matter. As many readers of this Review will know, one needs
to pay close attention when he speaks. To anyone who has been at all
exposed to the subject, I need only say that Benjamin Kaplan's
Unhurried View in all respects equals, and in many surpasses, Zechariah
Chafee's Reflections on the Law of Copyright.'8
RALPn S. BROWN, JR.*
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